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ERISA's Quantity vs. Quality Doctrine:
The Eighth Circuit Limits Recovery




Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") were developed to facilitate
the provision of effective care at low prices to plan members.2 To attain this
purpose, HMOs have been required to act as both providers who administer care
and gatekeepers who can deny access to care.3 The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), praised as "the greatest development in the life
of the American Worker since Social Security,"4 regulates plans administered
by IMOs. Congress has stated explicitly that ERISA was enacted to promote
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.5 In
drafting ERISA, Congress sought to protect plan beneficiaries from the historical
mismanagement of their pension and benefit funds6 and to avoid a patchwork
scheme of state regulation that would expose plans and plan sponsors to varying
substantive standards, which could potentially increase the cost of health
benefits for employees.7
The stated purposes of liMOs and ERISA purport to be consumer-friendly.
In practice, however, HMOs and their use of ERISA's preemption provisions
have harmed plan participants. Relying on a judiciary that employs fine-line
distinctions and ERISA's procedural nuances to eliminate common law
remedies, lIMOs often abuse their ability to control the quality of care by
denying legitimate claims.' This abuse, sometimes committed through the hands
1. 188 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1242 (2000).
2. Richard Epstein, HMO Lawsuits: A Liability for Patients, Too, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 28, 1999, at A26.
3. Id.
4. Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L.
REv. 631, 672-73 (1994).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
6. Craig M. Stephens, Note, ERISA: The Inevitable But Unexpected Hurdles of the
Plaintiff's Welfare Benefit Plan, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 151, 151 (1996) (citing George
L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions,
36 ARiz. L. REv. 611, 614 (1994)).
7. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
8. See generally Rouco, supra note 4, at 672-73 ("The protection of employees'
interests envisioned by ERISA... quickly dissipated in the hands of the federal judiciary
... [r]eferences to concerns about separation of powers and the proper role of the
1
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of someone with no more than a high school diploma,9 has resulted in extensive
injury and, sometimes, death to plan participants.
In Hull v. Fallon,'O the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit limited the plaintiffs recovery against his HMO and the plan's
administrator to those remedies provided for by ERISA's civil enforcement
scheme. The court applied the "quantity vs. quality" doctrine and determined
that because the plaintiff s claim was for a denial of benefits (a quantity claim)
rather than poor treatment (a quality claim), his state medical malpractice action
was completely preempted by ERISA.1 As a result, the plaintiff was stripped
of his common law remedies. Many federal courts have applied an analysis
similar to the analysis used in Hull;2 this is not contested. This Note argues,
however, that the analysis used by the court in Hull reaches results that are
inconsistent with ERISA's underlying objectives and the language of the Act,
which makes clear that ERISA was designed to promote the interests of
employees. 3
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jeffery Hull ("Hull") was an employee of Prudential Insurance Company.'4
As a Prudential employee, Hull participated in a health insurance plan issued by
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. ("the Plan"), which qualified as an employee
welfare benefit plan under ERISA.'5 In January 1996, Hull went to see his
primary care physician under the Plan, Dr. Delcau, complaining of shortness of
breath and pain in his arm and chest.16 As a result of Hull's complaints, Dr.
Delcau in January and February contacted the Plan's administrator, Dr. Richard
H. Fallon ("Dr. Fallon") and requested authorization to administer a thallium
judiciary ring hollow when procedural canons are used to justify the unilateral, and even
fraudulent, denial of employee benefits... [s]uch divergent interpretive approaches to
[ERISA] suggests that the Court seeks to effectuate a result that Congress never endorsed,
namely, limiting an employee access to judicial remedies.").
9. Eric M. Eusanio, Note, Control, Quality, and Cost: The Need For Federal
Legislation Amending ERISA 's Failure to Protect Consumers From Liability-Free MCOs,
7 J.L. & POL'Y 627, 628-29 (1999) (referring to legislative history that suggests giving
managed care organizations control over a patient's treatment "compromises the health
care system because mere high school graduates, not experienced doctors, are often
entrusted with the power to provide or deny treatment") (citing 144 CONG. Rc. S9733
(daily ed. Sept. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Durbin)).
10. 188 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1242 (2000).
11. Id. at 943.
12. See infra note 99.
13. See Hull, 188 F.3d at 942.
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stress test as part of his diagnosis and treatment plan for Hull. On both
occasions, Dr. Fallon denied the requests and instead authorized a treadmill
stress test.'
7
Hull filed a medical malpractice action in state court claiming that he
suffered a myocardial infarction and developed additional heart disease as a
result of Dr. Fallon denying the thallium stress test, 8 and that Dr. Fallon failed
to exercise sufficient care in diagnosing and treating him. 9 Hull also claimed
that the Plan was vicariously liable for Dr. Fallon's negligence.20 Dr. Fallon and
the Prudential defendants removed the case to federal district court,2' arguing
that federal question jurisdiction was created because Hull's state medical
malpractice claims were preempted by ERISA. 22
The district court found that Dr. Fallon was acting as the Plan administrator
and not as a treating physician.' Therefore, the court determined that Hull's
claims were based on a denial of benefits and were cognizable only under
Section 502(a) ("§ 502(a)") of ERISA.24 From this conclusion, the district court
held that Hull's claims were completely preempted by federal law.
25
17. Id. The stress tests mentioned in Hull are used to unmask coronary artery
disease and to monitor its treatment. Janet Pinner, RN, 54 PATIENT TEACHING FOR X-
RAY AND OTHER DIAGNOsTICs 32 (1991). During a "treadmill stress test," the patient
walks on a treadmill at gradually increasing speeds and increasing angles of incline while
his cardiovascular response is recorded. Id. The thallium stress test is a variation of the
treadmill stress test in which a small amount of radioactive material is injected into a vein
in the patient's arm or hand while he exercises; the patient is then positioned so that a
camera-like scanning device can record which areas are receiving adequate amounts of
blood. Id. A doctor uses a thallium stress test to attain more detailed information about
the flow of blood to the patient's heart and the patient's response to monitored exercise.
Id.




21. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
22. Hull, 188 F.3d at 941. The defendants also filed a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cognizable cause of action under ERISA; the Honorable Rodney W. Sippel,
District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, agreed and granted Hull thirty days
to amend his complaint. Id. at 942 n.3. Hull did not file an amended complaint, and on
appeal Hull did not contest the district court's conclusion on this point. Id. at 943.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (1994).
24. Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1242
(2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
25. Hull, 188 F.3d at 942. The Supreme Court has indicated "there is complete
preemption under § 502(a) whenever a plaintiff s cause of action falls within the scope
of an ERISA provision that the plaintiff can enforce via § 502(a)." Rice v. Panchal, 65
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On June 17, 1999, Hull appealed, arguing that his cause of action was not
based on a denial of a requested benefit but on his doctor-patient relationship
with Dr. Fallon, the Plan administrator. 6 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit found that Dr. Fallon's action as the Plan administrator in
refusing to authorize the thallium stress test was a determination of benefits and
held that Hull's state claims for medical malpractice were completely preempted
by ERISA
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. An Introduction to ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in response to the growth in size, scope,
and number of employee benefit plans.28 The Act, as noted previously, has two
primary goals. First, ERISA seeks to protect beneficiaries of pension and
welfare benefit plans from mismanagement.29 Traditionally, beneficiaries of
pension plans and benefit plans who assumed that their invested funds would be
available at retirement (or in a medical situation) were often disappointed to find
that their money had been invested poorly or not at all.30 Prior to the enactment
of ERISA, beneficiaries were forced to bring state court actions in order to
recover their benefits.3' In state court, however, beneficiaries often encountered
jurisdictional and procedural impediments that left them in no better position
than when they started their action to recover the benefits.32 The second goal of
ERISA is to provide a uniform statutory framework that protects plans from state
regulatory schemes that could expose them and their sponsors to varying
substantive standards, inadvertently increasing the cost of health benefits for
employees.33
26. Id. at 942.
27. Id. at 943.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
29. Stephens, supra note 6, at 151.
30. Stephens, supra note 6, at 151.
31. Stephens, supra note 6, at 151.
32. Stephens, supra note 6, at 151 (citing Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 310 (6th
Cir. 1974); Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786,790 (8th Cir. 1944)); see also Angela M.
Easley, A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA Preemption of HMO Medical Malpractice
Claims: The Dissatisfactory Distinction Between Quality and Quantity of Care, 20
CAMPBELL L. REV. 293, 298 & n.33 (1998) (citing Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583
(Ga. Ct. App. 1935); Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139, 143
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937); David v. Veitscher Manesitwerke Actien Gesellschaft, 35 A.2d
346, 349 (Pa. 1944)).
33. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 65
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ERISA subjects plans providing employees with fringe benefits to federal
regulation.34 The statute's comprehensive regulatory scheme encompasses those
pension and welfare benefit plans that provide "'medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits' for plan partidipants or their beneficiaries 'through the purchase
of insurance or otherwise.' ' 35 ERISA does not require that employers provide
any particular benefits; it simply controls benefit plan administration.36 ERISA
imposes reporting and disclosure mandates, participation and vesting
requirements, funding standards, and fiduciary responsibilities for plan
administrators. 37 The Act also imposes criminal sanctions, establishes a civil
enforcement scheme, and preempts some state law.3"
Section 502 of ERISA establishes the Act's civil enforcement scheme.39
Section 502(a) allows a plan participant or beneficiary to bring an action to
"recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan." It is important to note, however, that when a plaintiff brings
an action under § 502(a), her remedies are limited to the amount of benefits she
is entitled to under the plan.41
Section 502(e)(1) states that "the district courts of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the
Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.... "42 However, if an
action is brought by a participant or beneficiary under § 502(a) to recover
benefits due, to enforce rights under the terms of a plan, or to clarify rights to
future benefits, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.43
34. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
35. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1995); see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
36. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 651.
37. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1051-1061, 1081-1086, 1104-1114 (1994);
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 651.
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1994); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 651.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
40. 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
41. See Rouco, supra note 4, at 639-40. Because § 502(a) limits a plaintiffs
recovery to the amount of benefits she is entitled to under the plan, preemption often has
a serious effect on a plaintiffs motives to litigate. Id. See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (holding that preemption under ERISA limits the claims
and remedies exclusively to those provided by § 502(a)).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1994).
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B. ERISA Preemption
Under ERISA, there are two distinct categories of preemption: (1) federal
preemption under ERISA's preemption clause, Section 514(a)("§ 514 (a)")," and
(2) complete preemption under § 502(a). 5 Only those claims that are subject to
complete preemption are removable to federal court;46 hence, the distinction
between preeemption under § 514(a) and complete preemption is often critical. 7
If the plaintiff's claims are preempted, the plaintiff will only recover if she has
a cognizable cause of action under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme, and her
remedies will be limited to those available in § 502.48
Congress drafted § 514(a) in broad terms.49 Section 514(a) preempts "any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan. . . ."" Under § 514(a), a state law may "relate to" an employee
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
45. See Easley, supra note 32, at 301. The doctrine of complete preemption acts
as an exception to the general principle that original federal question jurisdiction can only
be created when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises an issue of federal law. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987). The doctrine provides that
"to the extent that Congress has displaced a plaintiff's state law claim.., a plaintiff's
attempt to utilize the displaced state law is properly 'recharacterized' as a complaint
arising under federal law." Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 640 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995).
46. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987); Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. at 24-25. When a case has been removed to federal court and it is
determined that the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, even if the plaintiff's
state claim is arguably preempted under § 514(a), the district court is without the power
to decide the preemption dispute and must remand the case to the state court. Id. at 27-
28; see also Easley, supra note 32, at 301.
47. See, e.g., Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
1242 (2000); Taylor, 481 U.S. at 58; Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 1; Rice, 65 F.3d at
637.
48. See Hull, 188 F.3d at 942 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
54 (1987)); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302
(1993).
49. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Section 514(a), it should be noted, does not
preempt "any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). This exception for regulation of insurance, banking, or
securities is itself limited, however, by the provision that states an employee welfare
benefit plan shall not be:
[D]eemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company,
or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 651 (1995).
[Vol. 65
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benefit plan and therefore be preempted, even though the state law affects the
employee benefit plan only incidentally.51 Complete preemption under § 502(a)
is more difficult to establish and requires a more detailed explanation than what
is offered for federal preemption under § 514(a).
The application of the complete preemption doctrine in the ERISA context
originated in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust.
5 2
In Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court held a suit by the state against a
welfare benefit trust to collect taxes was not completely preempted by ERISA,
and therefore, was not removable to federal court. 3 The Court looked to
precedent governing Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act54 in
holding that only causes of action falling within the scope of§ 502(a) of ERISA
are removable under the complete preemption rule.55 The Court noted, however,
that § 502(a) "does not purport to reach every question relating to plans covered
by ERISA."
56
51. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 139).
52. 463 U.S. 1 (1983), cited in Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1995).
53. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 1.
54. In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass' of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the Court held that any cause of action arising
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act is purely a creature of federal law
and therefore removable.
55. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23-27. The Supreme Court has subsequently
indicated that there is complete preemption under § 502(a) whenever a plaintiffs cause
of action falls within the scope of an ERISA provision, e.g., § 510, that the plaintiff can
enforce via § 502(a). Rice, 65 F.3d at 641-42, (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133, 142-45 (1990) (holding a state common law action for wrongful discharge
to defeat pension benefits was preempted under § 510 as enforced via § 502(a)).
56. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25. One might note the Court's use of the
"relating to" language from § 514. Franchise Tax Board has been cited as holding that
"preemption under [S]ection 514(a) does not permit a defendant to remove a suit brought
in state court to federal court when the plaintiffs state claim does not fall within the
scope of ERISA's civil remedy provisions." Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,
355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987) (stating that ERISA preemption under Section 514(a)
"without more, does not convert [the] state claim into an action arising under federal
law"). The Court in Taylor cited Franchise Tax Board for the proposition that a state
action must not only be preempted by ERISA § 514, but also must come within the scope
of § 502(a) to fall within the Avco rule. Id. See supra note 54. But see Kuhl v. Lincoln
Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 300 (1993). In Kuhl, the HMO
filed a notice of removal asserting that ERISA provides federal question jurisdiction over
the plaintiff s claims. The plaintiffs sought remand, arguing that ERISA did not apply.
Id. The district court denied the motion to remand, stating that the plaintiff s claims were
"related to" the ERISA plan and therefore were preempted. Id. at 301. On appeal, the
plaintiff-appellants argued that the district court erred in denying their motion to remand
because their state law claims were not preempted by ERISA. Id. The Eighth Circuit
upheld the district court's order denying the motion to remand on the grounds that Kuhl's
2000]
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Interpreting the holdings of Franchise Tax Board and subsequent Supreme
Court authority, 7 the Seventh Circuit in Rice v. PanchaP set out two elements
that must be-satisfied before a state claim can be completely preempted under
ERISA. According to Rice, the first prerequisite of complete preemption under
§ 502(a) is that the plaintiff have standing to bring a claim under § 502.' 9 The
second element, according to Rice, is that the claim be within the subject matter
of § 502(a).' In addition to articulating this two-part analysis, the Rice court
found a common thread running through the cases discussing complete
preemption under ERISA. According to the court, "complete preemption is
required where a state law claim cannot be resolved without an interpretation of
the contract [i.e. the benefit plan] governed by federal law.' 61 The Rice court
stated that this finding seemed consistent with earlier Supreme Court cases
because those cases finding complete preemption involved claims for benefits
due under an ERISA plan, or they involved state law claims measuring the
quality of contractual performance, thereby interpreting an ERISA plan.62
C. Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims and HMO Liability:
The Quantity vs. Quality Doctrine
Courts determining whether ERISA preempts direct and vicarious liability
claims for negligent treatment of patients enrolled in benefit plans have
distinguished between claims alleging poor quality of care from a physician and
claims involving quantity of care or denials of plan benefits.6' The general rule
is that claims concerning the quality of care are not preempted by ERISA, while
claims involving the quantity of care are completely preempted. 6 It has been
claims "related to" the benefit plan in question. Id. at 303. Kuhl's application of a § 514
analysis to justify removal, however, is contrary to the weight of authority. See
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4.
57. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 58.
58. 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995).
59. See Rice, 65 F.3d at 641 (stating that the underlying rationale for the decision
in Franchise Tax Board that § 502(a) did not completely preempt either state law action
was that the State could not act as a plaintiff to bring suit under § 502(a)); Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 26 (1983).
60. See Rice, 65 F.3d at 641 (reiterating that, in Taylor, the Court held that a
plaintiff's claims were completely preempted by §502(a) because his claim for benefits
was within the scope of §502(a)(1)(B)); Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66.
61. Rice, 65 F.3d at 644.
62. Id.
63. Easley, supra note 32, at 302.
64. Id.; see In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that claims that fall within the essence of an administrator's activities (i.e., determining
eligibility of benefits, calculating those benefits, disbursing them to the participant,
monitoring available funds, and keeping records), fall within § 502(a)(1)(B) and are
[Vol. 65
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/5
QUANTITY VS. QUALITYDOCTRINE
recognized, however, that the distinction between a claim involving the quantity
of care and a claim involving quality of benefits is not always crystal clear. 5
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.' provides an example where a
court preempted the plaintiff's claim because it involved a quality or denial of
benefits claim. In Jass, the plaintiff sued a registered nurse who also was acting
as a utilization review administrator for the plaintiff's HMO, Prudential.67 The
plaintiff alleged that the nurse negligently determined that the plaintiff did not
need physical therapy to rehabilitate her knee and discharged her from the
hospital.' The Seventh Circuit held that when the nurse determined the physical
therapy was unnecessary and discharged the plaintiff from the hospital, the nurse
made a benefits determination within the meaning of ERISA and, therefore, the
plaintiff's claim was completely preempted under § 502(a).69 The plaintiff in
Jass also brought a cause of action against her HMO for the nurse's alleged
negligence on a vicarious liability theory.70 The court found, however, that
because it had already held that the nurse's actions were appropriately
characterized as a denial of benefits, any vicarious liability claim against the
plaintiff's HMO would be a claim arising from a benefits denial and would be
completely preempted under § 502(a).71
completely preempted; whereas, claims that fall within the essence of a health care
provider (i.e., arranging and providing medical treatment, directly or through contracts
with hospitals, doctors, or nurses), are subject to the prevailing state law standard of
care).
65. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1009 (1995) (stating the distinction is difficult where the benefit contracted for is
health care services rather than money to pay for such services).
There well may be cases in which the quality of a patient's medical care or the
skills of the personnel provided to administer that care will be so low that the
treatment received simply will not qualify as health care at all. In such a case,
it well may be appropriate to conclude that the plan participant or beneficiary
has been denied benefits due under the plan.
Id.
66. 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
67. Id. at 1489.
68. Id. at 1485.
69. Id. at 1489.
70. Id. at 1490.
71. Id. at 1491. Jass is also instructive because suit was brought against the
treating physician, one of the many doctors on the HMO's list of physicians participating
in the plan, asserting negligence in the quality of treatment. Id. at 1485. The court held
that the plaintiff's vicarious liability claim against her HMO for her treating physician's
negligence was not completely preempted; however, because the court already had
established subject matter jurisdiction, the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the claim that the HMO was vicariously liable for the treating physician's
negligence. Id. at 1491-92. The court then found that although the plaintiff's claim that
the HMO was vicariously liable for the treating physician's negligence, the claim was not
completely preempted under § 502(a), however, the claim was preempted under § 514
2000]
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,Dukes v. US. Healthcare, Inc.,72 on the other hand, provides an example
where a plaintiff's malpractice and vicarious liability claims were not preempted
under the quantity vs. quality doctrine because they were determined to be
claims about the quality of the benefits received, not claims to recover benefits
due under the plan.73 In Dukes, two seperate cases were consolidated on appeal.
The claims at issue included: (1) a claim that certain doctors and medical
service providers were negligent in failing to perform particular blood tests and
that the HMO was vicariously liable, and (2) a claim that doctors were negligent
in ignoring the plaintiff's symptoms of pre-eclampsia in her third trimester of
pregnancy, which resulted in the death of the unborn. 4 The Third Circuit held
that the claims fell outside the scope of § 502(a) because they involved the
quality of the benefits received.75 Therefore, the court remanded the claims to
state court.76
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Hull, the Eighth Circuit first noted that the propriety of the district
court's consideration of the case was dependent on the existence of federal
question jurisdiction," which generally is determined by the issues raised in the
plaintiffs well pleaded complaint.7" The court then recognized an exception to
because the claim "relate[d] to" the benefit plan. Id. at 1495. The court rested this
holding on the fact that the doctor's alleged negligence concerned a failure to treat rather
than the poor execution of treatment. Id. at 1493. But see Pacificare of Okla., Inc., v.
Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995). In Pacificare, the court held the vicarious liability
claim against the HMO was not preempted by § 514. Id. at 154. The court stated, "the
present claim does not involve the administration of benefits or the level or quality of
benefits promised by the plan; the claim alleges negligent care by the doctor and an
agency relationship between the doctor and the IMO." Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
72. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995).
73. Id. at 357.
74. Id. at 352-53.
75. Id. at 356-57.
76. Id. at 356. The court did not address whether the vicarious liability claims that
were remanded would be preempted by § 514; the federal court was without jurisdiction
to decide this issue. Id. at 355. Cases have held that § 514 preempts vicarious liability
claims, and cases have also held that IMOs may be vicariously liable for the malpractice
of their physicians. See generally Easley, supra note 32, at 309-14. The possibility that
a state court may hold that a vicarious liability claim is not preempted adds importance
to a federal court's determination of whether a claim is completely preempted. If a claim
is not preempted, the plaintiff will not be limited to the remedies under § 502(a) but
rather will be able to pursue common law remedies. See supra note 41.
77. Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1242
(2000) (recognizing there was not complete diversity between the parties).
78. Id. (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)).
(Vol. 65
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the general rule-the complete preemption doctrine.79 Applying this doctrine,
the court reasoned, "federal question jurisdiction exists-and the case may be
removed to federal court-if Hull's state law claims arise in an area that has
been displaced by ERISA." 80
Next, the court noted that ERISA was designed to promote the interests of
employees,8' and it recognized that ERISA's preemption clause was drafted in
broad terms to facilitate a comprehensive federal scheme.82 The court then
articulated its version of the general rule for determining whether claims are
completely preempted under ERISA: any "[c]auses of action within the scope
of, or that relate to, the civil enforcement provisions of 502(a) are removable to
federal court despite the fact [that] the claims are couched in terms of state
law.)8 3
The court in Hull agreed with the district court that the "gravamen of Hull's
claims" was that he was denied a thallium stress test.84 Contrary to Hull's
arguments, the Eighth Circuit found that the only relationship Dr. Fallon had
with Hull was as the Plan administrator.85 The court then discussed Kuhl v.
Lincoln National Health Plan, Inc. as a case addressing similar facts. 6 In Kuhl,
a spouse brought an action for medical malpractice after the defendant plan had
canceled her husband's surgery because it was scheduled at an out-of-network
hospital.87 The Hull court quoted Kuhl's reasoning and noted that because
Kuhl's claims were essentially based on the manner in which his plan responded
79. Hull, 188 F.3d at 942 ("[The complete preemption] doctrine provides that 'to
the extent that Congress has displaced a plaintiff's state law claim... a plaintiff's attempt
to utilize the displaced state law is properly 'recharacterized' as a complaint arising under
federal law.") (quoting Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 640 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995)).
80. Hull, 188 F.3d at 942. Due to the fact that the plaintiff did not explicitly raise
any issues of federal law in his complaint, the complete preemption doctrine was the only
way to establish federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 941.
81. Id. at 942.
82. Id.
83. Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1242
(2000). Although the analysis used by the court in Hull is sound, one should be careful
in following the complete preemption rule in the way the court in Hull set it out. The
Supreme Court has only held that causes of action within the scope of § 502(a) are
removable; the court has rejected the argument that all claims relating to a benefit plan
fall within that section's scope. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25 (1983). It is possible that the court in Hull was only reiterating the
"within the scope of' language when it said "or relate to"; however, because the court
relied on Kuhl to frame this rule, such a possibility is unlikely. Kuhl, if the reader recalls,
went against the weight of authority by applying a "relate to" analysis under § 514 to
determine if removal was proper. Id.
84. Hull, 188 F.3d at 942.
85. Id. at 943.
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to a request for authorization of surgery, they involved the administration of
benefits and were preempted by ERISA."8
According to the court in Hull, however, a case with greater similarity
could be found in the Seventh Circuit." The Eighth Circuit explained the facts
of Jass° and noted that under those facts the Seventh Circuit had deemed the
plaintiff's claim to be a determination of benefits preempted by ERISA.9" The
court in Hull agreed with the district court that, like the nurse in Jass, Dr. Fallon
denied the thallium test as part of a determination of benefits. 2 The court further
noted that as a plan participant, Hull could have brought an action under
§ 502(a).93 "Because [Hull's] claims relate to the administration of benefits," the
court reasoned, the claims fall squarely within the scope of § 502(a).94
Finally, the court in Hull justified its holding with policy considerations.
It noted that plan administrators necessarily exercise medical judgment in
determining plan benefits.95 Finding that Hull's claims were not preempted, the
Eighth Circuit reasoned, would expose plan administrators to varying state
causes of action for claims within the scope of § 502(a).96 This, the court
believed, "would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress."97
88. Id.
89. Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1242
(2000) (citing Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996).
90. Hull, 188 F.3d at 943.
In Jass, the plaintiff had a knee replaced. The utilization review coordinator
(a registered nurse) for the defendant plan made a medical determination that
rehabilitation was not necessary .... As a result, the plaintiff suffered
permanent damage. This injury, the plaintiff claimed, gave rise to a state law
negligence claim not preempted by ERISA.
Id. (citing Jass, 88 F.3d at 1485, 1489).
91. Hull, 188 F.3d at 943.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court's use of the "relates to" language in this context, however, is in
accord with the Supreme Court's rulings in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987). See supra note 56. The court in Hull is stating that claims
relating to the administration of benefits are within the scope of § 502(a) and are
completely preempted; they are not saying that claims relating to those claims within the
scope of § 502(a) are completely preempted. Id.
95. Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1242
(2000).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)).
[Vol. 65
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Hull, although arguably misstating ERISA's complete preemption rule,
98
adhered to an analysis that many courts would apply when deciding whether a
doctor or HMO may be directly or vicariously liable for negligent treatment of
an ERISA plan participant.9 Hull, although not expressly, adopted an analysis
that distinguishes between claims of quantity and quality of benefits, completely
preempting those claims involving the quantity, or denial, of benefits.'0 Many
federal courts have used an analysis that is similar to the one used in Hull. As
a result, this fine-line distinction has relieved HMOs from responsibility and sent
a signal that plans can ignore their duty to pay legitimate claims, a duty that is
arguably imposed by ERISA. In an era when the quality of medical treatment
is often determined by what care is made available to patients, the distinction
used in Hull is not a distinction that benefits many plan participants.'O The
following section considers whether the "quantity vs. quality" doctrine is
consistent with the explicit purpose of ERISA and discusses recent proposed
legislation that would reinstate patients' rights against their HMOs.
A. ERISA: Is It Really for the Benefit of Employees?
The court in Hull recognized at the outset that ERISA was designed to
promote the interests of employees. 2 In applying the "quality vs. quantity"
doctrine, however, Hull and other courts have inadvertently harmed employees
by limiting participants' remedies to the amount of benefits due under their
plans. °3 In many situations, federal courts that categorize a plaintiff's claims as
"quantity" claims could label the plaintiff's claims as "quality" claims with little
or no change in the facts of the case."° With a judicial stamp that says "quality,"
98. See supra note 56.
99. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir.
1996); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage,
59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc.,
999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
100. Hull, 188 F.3d at 943. See generally Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356-61.
101. See Easley, supra note 32, at 314; Rouco, supra note 4, at 633 (arguing that
limiting recovery under § 502(a) to the benefits a party would have been able to receive
"sends a signal that fiduciaries can ignore many of the duties imposed by ERISA,
especially when dealing with welfare benefit claims").
102. Hull, 188 F.3d at 942; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
103. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). See generally
Rouco, supra note 4, at 633.
104. See, e.g., supra note 65.
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the court could remand the claims to state court, where a plantiff could possibly
recover common law damages105 Judicial discretion in applying the "quantity
vs. quality" doctrine, unfortunately, has not facilitated the use of common law
remedies but has led to their demise. The ramifications of this development are
severe. It has been argued that without traditional common law remedies, a
plaintiff will likely never have the chance to be made whole when injured by a
negligent denial ofbenefits.' ° This argument gains support when one looks, for
example, to the Kuhl decision cited by the court in Hull.'°7
In Kuhl, it was determined that the plaintiff Buddy Kuhl ("Kuhl") needed
heart surgery after suffering a heart attack on April 29, 1989.08 The HMO in
Kuhl, Lincoln National, arranged for a second opinion wherein Lincoln National
was informed that Kuhl was "at high risk of sudden death."'" Accordingly,
arrangements were made for Kuhl to undergo surgery at Barnes Hospital in St.
Louis because his chances of survival would be greater than if the surgery were
performed in Kansas City." ° On June 23, 1989, Lincoln National refused to
precertify payment for Kuhl's surgery because Barnes Hospital was outside the
Lincoln National service area; instead, Lincoln National scheduled an
appointment for Kuhl to see a doctor at the Research Medical Center in Kansas
City to determine if the surgery could be performed in Kansas City."' The
doctor at the Research Medical Center agreed that the surgery should be
performed in St. Louis and, two weeks later, Lincoln National informed Kuhl
that it would now authorize the surgery at Barnes Hospital."2 Kuhl immediately
attempted to schedule the surgery, but the surgery team was unavailable until
*September."' By this time, Kuhl's heart had deteriorated to such an extent that
the only way he could be helped was through a heart transplant; unfortunately,
Lincoln National refused to precertify payment for the transplant." 4 Kuhl died
105. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
106. See Easley, supra note 32, at 293 ("In effect, the ERISA provisions which
overrule state law mean that the majority of Americans have been stripped of their
historical legal protections against injury or death resulting from the actions of health
insurance companies.") (quoting Stephenie Overman, Legislation Seeking to Close
Loophole Protecting HMO's From Liability Suits, PHYS. FIN. NEws, May 15, 1997, at
34).
107. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir.
1993).
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on December 28, 1989 while awaiting the much-needed transplant.115 In a
situation like Kuhl, or in any situation where permanent damage is caused by a
refusal of benefits, it is unlikely that plan participants, or their beneficiaries,
would be adequately compensated by an award of the benefits that the
participant was wrongly refused. In such cases, a plaintiff needs common law
remedies in order to be made whole.
Attacking the "quantity v. quality" doctrine from a different angle, one
could argue that such a distinction, i.e. one that ultimately enables HMOs to
control the quality of medical treatment and escape responsibility, provides an
incentive for IMOs to deny benefits.1 6 Logically, if an HMO's liability is
limited to unpaid benefits, an HMO has little incentive to refrain from denying
benefits.
In response, IMOs argue that allowing state causes of action for negligent
denials of benefits will force them to increase premiums and reduce benefits for
patients to offset increased litigation costs." 7 This argument, however, ignores
the principle that liability for wrongs comes with the territory in all professions
as an ordinary cost of business."' Furthermore, HMOs are arguably in a much
better position to bear losses than plan participants and, therefore, as a matter of
policy, should carry the heavier burden. 9
In a related contention, opponents of ERISA reform argue that allowing
malpractice claims against HMOs for negligent benefit denials would defeat one
of ERISA's primary purposes, the goal of developing a cost-efficient uniform
administrative scheme for health plans.2 Proponents of this argument contend
that nonpreemption of state tort claims would be contrary to the clear intent of
Congress because nonpreemption imposes a burden on the administration of
benefit plans.1 ' One can argue, however, that allowing malpractice claims
against IMOs does not contradict congressional intent. Medical malpractice
claims for wrongfully denying benefits would infringe upon an HMO's benefit
plan administration only tangentially; 2 it is unclear that requiring a plan
115. Id.
116. Id. at 304 ("We recognize the obvious salutary effect that imposing state law
liability on Lincoln National might have on deterring poor precertification decisions.").
See generally Rouco, supra note 4, at 633.
117. See Easley, supra note 32, at 313. See generally Epstein, supra note 2, at A26.
118. See Easley, supra note 32, at 313.
119. Easley, supra note 32, at 314.
120. See Seema K. Shah, Comment, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO
Medical Malpractice Claims: A Response to Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 80
MINN. L. REv. 1545, 1572-73 (1996).
121. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (citing 120
CONG. REc. 29197 & 29933 (1974)).
122. See Jose L. Gonzalez, A Managed Care Organization's Medical Malpractice
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administrator or utilization review coordinator to abide by state medical
malpractice laws would be any more burdensome than requiring that plan's staff
or the surgeons retained by the plan who give second opinions to abide by state
law." Courts have already required these plan officials to adhere to state
medical malpractice standards; 24 therefore, it is unlikely that the additional
burden placed on plans in requiring their administrators to abide by state law
would be significant. Because the interference in allowing malpractice claims
against HMOs for their plan administrator's negligence is slight, the goal of
administrative uniformity for health plans is not disturbed by allowing plaintiffs
to bring suit when they are improperly denied benefits.'25
B. A Statutory Solution?
One recent proposal would remedy the injustice patients endure by
amending ERISA's preemption clause.'26 The amendment would add the
following subsection to § 514:
(e) Preemption Not To Apply To Certain Actions Arising Out of
Provision Of Health Benefits
(1) Non Preemption of Certain Causes of Action
(A) In General... nothing in this title shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any cause of action by a participant or beneficiary
(or the estate of a participant or beneficiary) under State law to recover
damages resulting from personal injury or for wrongful death against
any person (i) in connection with the provision of insurance,
administrative services, or medical services by such person to or for
a group health plan. . . , or (ii) that arises out of the arrangement by
such person for the provision of such insurance, administrative
services, or medical services or other persons.'27
Liability for Denial of Care: The Lost World, 35 Hous. L. REv. 715, 774 (1998).
123. Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost
Containment: Lessonsfor Reformersfrom the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE 1.J. 1297,
1313-14 (1994).
124. Id.
125. See Shah, supra note 120, at 1572-73.
126. H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999).
127. Id.; see also Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, House Votes to Increase Rights
of HMO Patients, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1999, at Al (reporting that the House decided
resoundingly to pass HR 2723, a bill enabling participants to protest HMOs' medical
decisions in and out of court).
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If Congress were to enact this subsection, it would, for all intensive
purposes, invalidate an entire body of law interpreting ERISA's preemption
clause and the doctrine of complete preemption under § 502(a). 28 The law
would no longer limit patients' remedies to those provided in ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme. Acccordingly, patients would be allowed to pursue
legitimate tort claims against their HMOs in state court. Although the ultimate
fate of this proposed solution is uncertain,'29 the resounding support for the
legislation in the House serves as a positive indicator that a change in the law
regarding HMO liability is on the horizon. 30
Federal legislators, it should be noted, are not the only ones recognizing the
need for ERISA reform.13' Texas, for example, has enacted the Texas Health
Care Liability Act, which subjects HMOs to liability when they act negligently
in treating patients. 32 Under the Texas Act, HMOs may be held liable if they
"fail to use 'ordinary care' when deciding whether to pay for a medical
procedure."'33 According to Texas State Senator David Sibley, who introduced
the bill, "[i]f the HMOs choose to make medical decisions-stand in the shoes
of the doctor, as it were-they ought to stand in the shoes of the doctor in court,
too."
34
128. At first glance, one may question whether the House's bill would affect the
doctrine of complete preemption; after all, the amendment is to the preemption clause,
an aspect of ERISA preemption distinct from complete preemption under § 502(a). See
supra, note 57. This concern, however, quickly dissolves when one looks at the bill's text
that reads "nothing in this title shall be construed to invalidate. . ." H.R. 2723, 106th
Cong. (1999) (emphasis added).
129. Goldstein & Eilperin, supra note 127 (reporting that the leader of the Senate
negotiators would be "drawing a line" against broad reforms that allow more litigation
against HlMOs).
130. Goldstein & Eilperin, supra note 127 (reporting that HR 2723 passed on a vote
of 275 to 151).
131. Easley, supra note 32, at 317; see also Goldstein & Eilperin, supra note 127
(noting that the federal legislation resembles laws adopted recently by three
states-Texas, Georgia, and California-that make it easier for patients to sue HMOs).
132. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (West Supp. 1999);
Easley, supra note 32, at 317.
133. Easley, supra note 32, at 317; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 88.002(a) (West Supp. 1999). But see Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 597 & 621 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that provisions of Texas Health
Care Liability Act making managed care entities liable for substandard health care
treatment decisions are not preempted by ERISA, but recognizing that "a suit may only
be brought under the Act that challenges the quality of care received, not a benefit
termination").
134. Easley, supra note 32, at 317. Legislative solutions, however, are only one
method of dealing with substandard health care treatment decisions. For a nonlegislative
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VI. CONCLUSION
Congress explicitly stated that the primary objective of ERISA is to
promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans.'35 The court in Hull v. Fallon, however, applied an analysis that can
inadvertently harm employees. Since the creation of the HMO, the quality of
medical treatment is all too often dictated by a determination of what benefits
the HMO will or will not approve. When federal courts preempt those claims
involving the quantity of treatment, they indirectly lower the quality of medical
treatment by giving HMOs free passes to close doors that legitimately should
remain open to plan participants. The analysis applied in Hull is in sync with an
approach a majority of courts would apply; however, this analysis is hardly
consistent with ERISA's overarching objective of promoting the interests of
employees. There may be a day when the reasoning in Hull is superseded by
congressional action. Until that day, however, plan participants' claims
involving the denial or quantity of benefits will continue to be preempted.
JEREMY P. BRuMMOND
solution, see David S. Hilzenrath, HMO to Leave Care Decisions Up to Doctors, WASH.
POsT, Nov. 9, 1999, at Al (reporting that United Healthcare, one of the nation's largest
managed care companies said that it will stop overruling doctors' decisions about what
care patients should receive). But see id. (quoting Rep. Greg Ganske (R-Iowa) stating
that "United's announcement may be part of the industry's effort to show that legislation
is unnecessary, but 'what we really need is something that has the force of law' for all
health plans").
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